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DUE PROCESS AND THE IRAQ SANCTIONS: A RESPONSE TO DEVIKA HOVELL 
Joy Gordon* 
Devika Hovell raises deeply significant questions about the role of  due process in the legitimacy of  the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC).1 Hovell gives us a fine-grained analysis of  what exactly makes due 
process so compelling; in her approach, the reasons why it is compelling will vary in different contexts, 
depending upon the particular value and function it serves. In particular, she discusses three ways of  articulat-
ing the values underlying due process, and the models of  due process that would follow from each. She then 
discusses how her analysis would play out in two situations: The Council’s use of  asset freezes, and the role 
of  the UN in the cholera epidemic in Haiti. In her case studies, she looks at situations where due process has 
been insufficient, and discusses some of  the UN’s attempts to remedy this, and the organizational difficulties 
in doing so.   
I would like to look at two other Chapter VII actions by the UNSC, both related to the sanctions regime 
imposed on Iraq from 1990 to 2003: The denial of  humanitarian exemptions; and the payment of  reparations 
through the UN Compensation Commission (UNCC). I will suggest that these aspects of  the sanctions 
regime lacked due process by any of  the models proposed by Hovell. 
In both cases, I will suggest that the practices of  the Security Council were illegitimate, in that they exceed-
ed the scope of  their mandate, or acted in contravention to it. But we might go a step further as well, and 
consider whether the failure of  due process is, in some contexts, deliberate. It seems unlikely that there would 
be real disagreement with the values of  due process, as Hovell has articulated them: Ensuring factual accuracy 
in decision-making settings; respecting the voices of  those who are affected; and serving the well-being of  the 
broader community. Thus, we might think that, to the extent there are systematic failures of  due process, 
these would surely be unintentional.    
But in looking at the denial of  humanitarian exemptions, and reparations under the authority of  the 
UNCC, we see that the lack of  due process allowed powerful states on these committees to obscure their 
roles and avoid accountability. If  we look a bit more closely, we then also see that some of  the actors involved 
had economic interests or a political agenda which would be compromised by procedures ensuring transpar-
ency and inclusion. The problem, in other words, is not the lack of  a shared value-based theory of  due 
process, but a lack of  political will on the part of  powerful states. 
Denial of  Humanitarian Exemptions 
The sanctions imposed on Iraq, in response to Iraq’s invasion of  Kuwait, were certainly the most extensive, 
complex, and draconian sanctions regime ever used as a tool of  global governance. All Member States were 
prohibited from importing any goods from Iraq, or from exporting any goods to Iraq, other than medicine. 
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Even food exports were conditional.2 Iraq was highly dependent on oil exports for its income, and was also 
highly dependent on imports for a wide range of  needs. Iraq had imported two-thirds of  its food supplies, 
and relied on imported machinery and spare parts to maintain its electricity production, water treatment, 
telecommunications, and oil production.3   
The sanctions were not immediately devastating. From August 1990 to January 1991, there were sufficient 
supplies to maintain water treatment and electricity. Food rations were introduced, and agricultural produc-
tion was increased. However, the Persian Gulf  War of  early 1991 devastated all of  Iraq’s infrastructure—
every major electrical generator, water treatment plant, telecommunications facility, every major industrial and 
petroleum facility, as well as roads, dams, and bridges. Iraq was, within a matter of  weeks, reduced to a prein-
dustrial state.4  
The sanctions regime was overseen by the UNSC’s “661 Committee.” The membership of  the 661 Com-
mittee paralleled that of  the UNSC itself, with representation from each member serving on the UNSC. 
However, unlike the UNSC, the 661 Committee met behind closed doors, and held no public meetings. The 
minutes of  its meetings were not available to any government or party outside the committee. Indeed, the 
minutes of  the committee’s meetings were not even distributed to all of  its own members: Only the perma-
nent members regularly received them.   
The lack of  transparency became particularly problematic once it became clear that the 661 Committee’s 
primary function was to review requests for exemptions to the sanctions regime on humanitarian grounds. 
For example, between August 1990 and January 1991, there were numerous requests from vendors for per-
mission to deliver foodstuffs to Iraq. However, Resolution 661 permitted food exports to Iraq only “in 
humanitarian circumstances.” Behind closed doors, the members of  the 661 Committee argued intensely over 
how “humanitarian circumstances” should be interpreted. The United States, Britain, and France maintained 
that this condition meant food exports to Iraq should be allowed only after there was irrefutable evidence of  
famine, or near-famine. Cuba and Yemen, who were on the Council at the time, argued that a civilian popula-
tion has a right to food under any circumstances, and that “humanitarian circumstances” would be present if  
there was a likelihood of  any degree of  food shortages.5   
However, neither the Iraqi government nor any other organization was permitted to meet with the 661 
Committee to present its evidence of  human needs. The request for exemptions could only come from the 
UN mission or the companies or organizations seeking to export food to Iraq, who were not in a position to 
argue whether the requirement for “humanitarian circumstances” had been met. It would have been helpful 
to have recourse to a judicial body, or even an external legal advisor, such as the UN’s Office of  Legal Coun-
sel, in interpreting “humanitarian circumstances.” But instead, the matter was resolved within the framework 
of  the 661 Committee’s internal political process: Those opposing food exports simply invoked their inter-
pretation of  the clause as grounds for blocking consensus.   
In the end, no food exports to Iraq were allowed from August 1990 to March 1991. At that point, UN ob-
servers described Iraq’s devastation from the massive bombing campaign as “near apocalyptic.”6 It was only 
then that the 661 Committee agreed that “humanitarian circumstances” were present, and began allowing 
food exports to Iraq. 
 
2 SC Res. 661 (Aug. 6, 1990). 
3 Secretary-General, Letter Dated 20 March 1991 to the President of  the Security Council, UN Doc. S/22366 (Mar. 20, 1991). 
4 Id. 
5 Paul Conlon, memorandum, Historical Note on the Security Council’s Disputed Right to Ban Supplies of Foodstuffs to a State under Sanction, 
June 26, 1998. 
6 Secretary-General, Letter Dated 20 March 1991 to the President of  the Security Council, UN Doc. S/22366, Annex, para. 8 (Mar. 
20, 1991).  
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In 1996, the Oil for Food Program (OFFP) was introduced, allowing Iraq to sell oil and use the proceeds 
to buy humanitarian goods. Within the framework of  the program, there was increased transparency in some 
regards. UN agencies (such as UNICEF, WHO, and FAO) were tasked with reporting on the equity, adequacy, 
and efficiency of  the Oil for Food Program, and these reports were posted publicly. However, all decisions 
concerning equipment and goods for Iraqi infrastructure, including electricity and water treatment, were still 
subject to approval on a case-by-case basis by the 661 Committee, and were routinely denied. The 661 Com-
mittee’s votes and the decision making process continued to be entirely opaque. 
Many of  these due process concerns, such as the lack of  judicial review, were also applicable to the Security 
Council itself. But the 661 Committee was even less transparent and had fewer mechanisms of  accountability. 
The Security Council holds public meetings, adopts resolutions that are publically available, and holds public 
votes of  its members. By contrast, the 661 Committee did not make available its decisions or the votes of  its 
members. Thus, while public pressure might in principle be brought to bear in response to Security Council 
votes, the 661 Committee’s opaque procedures made that impossible. 
Within the 661 Committee, the United States and Britain blocked billions of  dollars of  contracts for criti-
cal humanitarian goods. In large measure as a result of  these practices, critical public services, such as 
electricity, health care, and water treatment, were never restored to adequate levels, and the majority of  the 
Iraqi population remained severely impoverished for the entirety of  the sanctions regime. 
UN Compensation Commission 
There was a similar lack of  accountability and absence of  due process in the matter of  Iraq’s reparations to 
Kuwait. Security Council Resolution 687 provided for the creation of  the United Nations Compensation 
Commission, which would receive claims related to Iraq’s invasion of  Kuwait in 1990. These claims were to 
be paid with the proceeds from oil sales under the Oil for Food Program (and a predecessor program in 
1991). The oil sales were authorized in order to generate revenue to pay for imports, such as food and medi-
cine, to meet humanitarian needs. However, a substantial portion of  these proceeds were set aside to pay 
compensation claims. Initially, 30 percent of  these proceeds were to be used for this purpose; later, this was 
reduced to 25 percent.   
From the beginning, there were objections regarding the transparency and fairness of  this process. Iraq 
was not considered to be a party to the process. According to Iraq’s legal counsel, under the UNCC proce-
dure Iraq had no right to be informed of  the claims against it; and in some cases Iraq still had not been 
notified, years after claims were filed.7 During the claim review process, Iraq was not entitled to see or address 
the evidence presented regarding the claims. Once the UNCC made its award determination, there was no 
venue where Iraq could challenge or appeal the UNCC’s judgments. Iraq was permitted only to comment, one 
time, on the Secretariat’s explanation for its position.8 At the same time, there were significant questions in 
some cases about the legitimacy of  the amounts awarded. For example, the UNCC awarded the Kuwait 
Petroleum Company $15.9 billion as compensation for its claimed losses. But one commentator maintained 
that, of  the $15.9 billion awarded, the actual damages to Kuwait were overstated by at least $12 billion.9 In 
addition, the Iraqi government maintained that in 575 cases the UNCC compensated claimants twice for the 
same claim.10 By 2003, the UNCC had paid close to $20 billion in claims, from Iraqi funds.11  
 
7 Michael E. Schneider, How Fair and Efficient Is the UNC System? A Model to Emualte?, 15 J. INT’L ARB. 15 1, 2 (1998). 
8 Id. at 6. 
9 Thomas R. Stauffer, Critical Review of UNCC Award for Lost Production and Lost Revenues, 44(5) MIDDLE EAST ECON. SURV. (2001). 
10 Statement by Riyadh Al- Qaysi, United Nations Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 4336th Meeting, 
S/PV.4336 (Resumption 1), 17 (June 28, 2001). 
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Applying Hovell’s Framework 
Hovell’s framework for analyzing the core justifications of  due process is useful here in capturing exactly 
why the lack of  due process in these two situations—the handling of  humanitarian exemptions and the 
operation of  the compensation commission—is problematic.   
Insofar as due process is instrumentalist, the absence of  due process undermined the ostensible interest of  
meeting humanitarian needs in the exemptions scenario. Because there were no clear, publicly stated criteria 
for approval of  sanctions exemptions (and any member of  the 661 Committee could block almost any goods 
indefinitely), the result was that the United States alone, sometimes accompanied by the United Kingdom, 
blocked billions of  dollars of  export contracts to Iraq for electrical generators, agricultural production, water 
treatment, pharmaceutical production, housing and road construction, and other goods critical to sustain a 
population.12 Thus, if  the purpose of  the review was to grant the exemptions needed to ensure the basic well-
being of  the Iraqi population, this was compromised by the lack of  transparency, the absence of  clear and 
consistent guidelines, and the lack of  a venue in which to provide factual information or contest factual 
claims.   
Under the dignitarian model, we would likewise see a failure of  due process. The Iraqi mission at the Unit-
ed Nations was not permitted to attend or participate in meetings of  the 661 Committee; nor were 
organizations or entities that might speak to the interests of  the stakeholders, such as NGOs. UN humanitar-
ian agencies, such as UNICEF, were almost never permitted to attend committee meetings to advocate for 
exemptions or provide information on the humanitarian situation. And the due process model informed by 
the public interest and the international community is applicable as well. In the end, the policies of  the 661 
Committee were a major factor in the collapse of  Iraqi health care and education, rampant malnutrition, and 
the systematic, extreme impoverishment of  almost an entire country. Top UN officials and many others 
maintained that the resulting situation violated international law and human rights. 
Turning to the reparations process, we could certainly say that due process here would serve an instrumen-
talist function, and the key process value would be accuracy. In this case, the exclusion of  Iraq from the 
process meant that the accuracy of  the claims was uncertain. This uncertainty characterized both the deter-
mination of  whether Iraq’s acts were the cause of  the particular damage at issue, and the measurement of  
that damage. We can also see the dignitarian model at play here as well, where the key process value is the 
representation of  the interests of  the stakeholder. In this case, the stakes were quite high. The Oil for Food 
program, running at maximum capacity, barely generated enough revenue to cover basic needs for the Iraqi 
population. The use of  25-30 percent of  those revenues to pay UNCC claims had a direct impact on Iraq’s 
ability to maintain its infrastructure, pay for food rations, and meet basic needs and provide public services to 
the Iraqi population. For this reason, we might also say that there was also a lack of  due process as articulated 
in Hovell’s third model, which is grounded in the broader public interest. 
Thus, both the reparations under the UNCC and the humanitarian exemptions within the broad sanctions 
on Iraq were characterized by a lack of  due process in many of  the ways that Hovell discusses. Insofar as due 
process serves to ensure legitimacy, we might well say that the practices of  the UNCC and the 661 Commit-
tee did not constitute legitimate acts of  global governance. Indeed, if  there had been greater transparency, it 
would have been apparent that both entities exceeded the scope of  their authority, and may have acted in 
contravention of  the UN Charter and international law. The Security Council resolutions authorized only the 
partial disarmament of  Iraq, not the subjection of  the population as a whole to widespread malnutrition and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
11 Stauffer, supra note 9. 
12 Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq, CASI Newsletter 5 (July 2002). 
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epidemics of  water-borne diseases. Article 1 of  the Charter provides that one of  the purposes of  the United 
Nations is “solving international problems of  an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character,” not 
worsening such problems. Article 55 of  the Charter reiterates this. Similarly, the mandate of  the UNCC was 
to provide compensation for damages suffered, not to exhaust Iraq’s resources well beyond any legitimate 
claims for reparations. 
The Problem of  Political Will  
The public position of  the Security Council and the 661 Committee was that the sanctions were never in-
tended to do indiscriminate harm to the Iraqi population or to bankrupt the country, but only to pressure the 
state to comply with international law and the disarmament requirements. However, the policy of  the United 
States was to create as much economic pressure on Iraq as possible, in order to bring about regime change. 
Driven by this agenda, throughout the history of  the sanctions regime, the United States (and to a lesser 
extent Great Britain) took extreme positions that would have been untenable in a public or impartial venue: 
Child vaccines, antibiotics, toothpaste, and equipment to manufacture cheese were all blocked by the United 
States on the dubious grounds that they might be used by Iraq to produce weapons of  mass destruction. On 
the occasions when these decisions became known, U.S. officials were embarrassed, and responded by shift-
ing policies in some fashion. For example, when the press reported that the United States was preventing the 
export of  child vaccines to Iraq,13 then-Secretary of  State Colin Powell sought to introduce a new procedure 
whereby the entire 661 Committee would adopt the United States’ list of  goods to be blocked, and the United 
States would no longer be identifiable as the nation responsible for these measures.14   
If  there had been transparency or other forms of  due process, it would have been readily apparent that the 
United States used the Security Council as a vehicle for pursuing its goal of  removing Saddam Hussein from 
power. However, Article 2 of  the Charter provides that the United Nations “is based on the principle of  the 
sovereign equality of  all its Members,” and many of  the Council’s resolutions concerning Iraq reiterate its 
commitment to respecting Iraq’s sovereignty. Consequently, the United States also sought to ensure that its 
means for pursuing regime change in Iraq were not subject to scrutiny or challenge. To achieve the latter, it 
was necessary to preclude any form of  due process. 
In both cases, the lack of  due process was not incidental. Rather, it reflected the tension between the stated 
purpose of  the UN bodies and the political goals of  some of  the Council’s members. Hovell’s models for due 
process are instructive here in giving precision to the sense that the Security Council acted illegitimately in 
these cases. It is not just that due process is a guarantor of  legitimacy. It is also the case that when we see 
elaborate efforts to prevent transparency and participation, we should examine these efforts with particular 
interest to see what is behind them. 
 
 
13 Ruling Party Blasts US Over Vaccines, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (Mar. 13, 2001). 
14 SC Res. 1409 (May 14, 2002), implementing the Goods Review List. 
